Subject: Fwd: A diagnosis & prescription to solve the Baluchistan riddle : The Stunning Investigative story on the Birth of Balochistan Liberation Army
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The Stunning Investigative story on the Birth of Balochistan Liberation Army
By Tariq Saeedi in Ashgabat, Sergi Pyatakov in Moscow, Ali Nasimzadeh
in Zahidan, Qasim Jan in Kandahar and SM Kasi in Quetta
MARCH 1: Deception and treachery. Live and let die. The ultimate zero
sum game. Repetition of bloody history: Call it what you may,
something is happening in the Pakistani province of Balochistan that
defies comprehension on any conventional scale.
Four correspondents and dozens of associates who collectively logged
more than 5000 kilometers during the past seven weeks in pursuit of a
single question – What is happening in Balochistan? have only been
able to uncover small parts of the entire picture.
However, if the parts have any proportional resemblance to the whole,
it is a frightening and mind-boggling picture. Every story must start
somewhere. This story should conveniently have started on the night of
7 January 2005 when gas installations at Sui were rocketed and much of
Pakistan came to almost grinding halt for about a week. Or, we should
have taken the night of 2 January 2005 as the starting point when an
unfortunate female doctor was reportedly gang-raped in Sui. However,
the appropriate point to peg this story is January 2002 and we shall
return to it in a minute.
Actually, the elements for the start of insurgency in Balochistan had
been put in place already and the planners were waiting for a
convenient catalyst to set things in motion. The gang-rape of 2
January, around which this sticky situation has been built, was just
the missing ingredient the planners needed.
Two former KGB officers explained that the whole phenomenon has been
assembled on skilful manipulation of circumstances. We shall keep
returning to their comments throughout this report.
As Pakistan and India continue to mend fences, as Iran, Pakistan and
India try to pool efforts to put a shared gas pipeline, as Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Turkmenistan join hands to lay a natural gas pipeline
of great economic and strategic importance, as the United States
continues to laud the role of Pakistan as a frontline nation in war
against terrorism, as Chinese contractors forge ahead with
construction work in Gwadar port and on trans-Balochistan highway, as
the Pakistan government makes efforts to bring Balochistan under the
rule of law and eliminate safe havens for terrorists and drug barons,
as the whole region tries to develop new long-term models to curb
terrorism and bring prosperity to far flung areas, there is a deadly
game going on in the barren and hostile hills of Balochistan. Lines
are muddy; there are no clear-cut sectors to distinguish friends from
foes.
Right in the beginning we would like to clarify that when we say
Indians, we mean some Indians and not the Indian governmentbecause we
don't have any way of ascertaining whether the activities of some
Indian nationals in Pakistan represent the official policy of their
government or is it merely the adventurism of some individuals or
organizations. When we say Iranians or Afghans, we mean just that:
Some Iranians or Afghans. We don't even know whether the Iranian and
Afghan players in Balochistan are trying to serve the interests of
their countries or whether their loyalties lie elsewhere.
But – and it is a BUT with capital letters – when we say Americans or
Russians, we have reasons to suspect that the American and Russian
involvement in Balochistan is sanctioned, at least in part, by
Pentagon (if not White House) and Kremlin.
We would also like to acknowledge that the picture we have gathered is
far from complete and except for the explanatory comments of two
former KGB officials, we have no way of connecting the dots in any
meaningful sequence. For the sake of honesty, this story should better
remain abrupt and incomplete. The story we are going to tell may sound
a lot like cheap whodunit but that is what we found out there.
Before zooming in to January 2002, let's set the background. We
consulted Sasha and Misha, two former KGB officers who are Afghanists
– the veterans of Russo-Afghan war – and they seem to know Balochistan
better than most Pakistanis. Obviously, Sasha and Misha are not their
real names. They live on the same street in one of the quieter suburbs
of Moscow. Two bonds tie them together in their retirement: While on
active duty in KGB, they were both frequent travelers to Balochistan
during the Russo-Afghan war where they were tasked to foment trouble
in Pakistan; and they are both wary of Vodka, the mandatory nectar of
Russian cloak and dagger community. They visit each other almost every
day and that is why it was easy to catch them together for long chats
over quantities of green tea and occasional bowls of Borsch.
We made more than a dozen visits to the single-bedroom flat of Misha,
where Sasha was also found more often than not, and we picked their
brains on Balochistan situation. As and when we unearthed new
information on Balochistan, we returned to Sasha and Misha for
comments.
As they told us, during the Russo-Afghan war, the Soviet Union was
surprised by the ability and resourcefulness of Pakistan to generate a
quick and effective resistance movement in Afghanistan. To punish
Pakistan and to answer back in the same currency, Kremlin decided to
create some organizations that would specialize in sabotage activities
in Pakistan.
One such organization was BLA (Balochistan Liberation Army), the
brainchild of KGB that was built around the core of BSO (Baloch
Students Organization). BSO was a group of assorted left-wing students
in Quetta and some other cities of Balochistan. Misha and Sasha can be
considered among the architects of the original BLA.
The BLA they created remained active during the Russo-Afghan war and
then it disappeared from the surface, mostly because its main source
of funding – the Soviet Union – disappeared from the scene. In the
wake of 9-11, when the United States came rushing to Afghanistan with
little preparation and less insight, the need was felt immediately to
create sources of information and action that should be independent of
the Government of Pakistan.
As Bush peered into the soul of Putin and found him a good guy,
Rumsfeld also did his own peering into the soul of his Russian
counterpart and found him a good game. The result was extensive and
generous consultation by Russian veterans who knew more about
Afghanistan and Balochistan than the Americans could hope to find.
It was presumably agreed that as long as their interests did not clash
with each other directly, the United States (or at least Pentagon) and
Kremlin would cooperate with each other in Balochistan. That brings us
to January 2002. "Actually, most of the elements were in place, though
dormant, and it was not difficult for anyone with sufficient resources
to reactivate the whole thing," said Misha about the present-day BLA
that is blamed for most of the sabotage activities in Balochistan.
In January 2002, the first batch of 'instructors' crossed over from
Afghanistan into Pakistan to set-up the first training camp. That was
the seed from which the present insurgency has sprouted. It seemed
like a modest effort back then.
Only two Indians, two Americans, and their Afghan driver-guide were in
a faded brown Toyota Hilux double cabin SUV that crossed the border
near Rashid Qila in Afghanistan and came to Muslim Bagh in Pakistani
province of Balochistan on 17 January 2002. For this part of the
journey, they used irregular trails. From Muslim Bagh to Kohlu they
followed the regular but less-frequented roads.
In Kohlu they met with some Baloch youth and one American stayed in
Kohlu while two Indians and one American went to Dera Bugti and
returned after a few days. They spent the next couple of weeks in
intense consultations with some Baloch activists and their mentors and
then the work started for setting up a camp.
"Balach was one of our good boys and even though I don't know who the
present operators are, it can be said safely that Kohlu must have been
picked as the first base because of Balach," said Misha.
Balach Marri is the son of Nawab Khair Baksh Marri and he qualified as
an electronic engineer from Moscow. As was customary during those
times, any Baloch students in Russia were cultivated actively and
lavishly by the KGB. Balach was one of their success stories.
Because of intimate connections with India and Russia, it was no
surprise that Balach Marri was picked as the new head of the revived
BLA. The mountains between Kohlu and Kahan belong to the Marris.
The first camp had some 30 youth and initial classes comprised mainly
of indoctrination lectures. The main subjects were:
1. Baloch's right of independence,
2. The Concept of Greater Balochistan,
3. Sabotage as a tool for political struggle,
4. Tyranny of Punjab and plight of oppressed nations,
5. Media-friendly methods of mass protest.
"Manuals, guidelines and even lecture plans were available in the
Kometit [KGB] archives. Except for media interaction, they virtually
followed the old plans," told Sasha.
As was logical, the small arms and sabotage training soon entered the
syllabus. First shipment of arms and ammunition was received from
Afghanistan but as the number of camps grew, new supply routes were
opened from India.
Kishangarh is a small Indian town, barely five kilometers from
Pakistan border where the provinces of Punjab and Sindh meet. There is
a supply depot and a training center there that maintains contacts
with militant training camps in Pakistan, including Balochistan.
There is also a logistics support depot near Shahgarh, about 90
kilometers from Kishangarh, that serves as launching pad for the
Indian supplies and experts.
These were unimportant stations in the past but they have gained
increasing importance since January 2002 when Balochistan became the
hub of a new wave of foreign activity.
The method of transfer from India to Balochistan is simple. Arms and
equipment such as Kalashnikov, heavy machine guns, small AA guns,
RPGs, mortars, land mines, ammunition and communication equipment are
transferred from Kishangarh and Shahgarh to Pakistani side on camel
back and then they are shifted to goods trucks, with some legitimate
cargo on top and the whole load is covered by tarpaulin sheets. Arms
and equipment are, as a rule, boxed in CKD or SKD form.
The trucks have to travel only 140 or 180 kilometers to reach Sui and
a little more to reach Kohlu, a distance that can be covered in a few
hours only. This is most convenient route because transferring
anything from Afghanistan to these areas demands much sturdy vehicles
that must cover longer distance over difficult terrain.
The small arms and light equipment are mostly of Russian origin
because they are easily available, cheap, and difficult to trace back
to any single source.
This route is also handy for sabotaging the Pakistani gas pipelines
because the two main arteries of Sui pipe – Sui-Kashmore-Uch-Multan
and Sui-Sukkur – are passing, at some points, less than 45 kilometers
from the Indian border. Whoever planned these camps and the subsequent
insurgency, had to obtain initial help in recruitment and
infrastructure from Indian RAW. "When we first started the BLA thing,
it was logical to ask for RAW assistance because they have several
thousands of ground contacts in Pakistan, many of them in
Balochistan," said Sasha.
"Anyone wanting to set shop in Pakistan needs to lean on RAW," added
Misha. The number of camps increased with time and now there is a big
triangle of instability in Balochistan that has some 45 to 55 training
camps, with each camp accommodating from 300 to 550 militants.
A massive amount of cash is flowing into these camps. American defence
contractors – a generic term applicable to Pentagon operatives in
civvies, CIA foot soldiers, instigators in double-disguise, fortune
hunters, rehired ex-soldiers and free lancers – are reportedly playing
a big part in shifting loads of money from Afghanistan to Balochistan.
The Americans are invariably accompanied by their Afghan guides and
interpreters.
Pay structure of militants is fairly defined by now. The ordinary
recruits and basic insurgents get around US $200 per month, a small
fortune for anyone who never has a hope of landing any decent
government job in their home towns. The section leaders get upward of
US $300 and there are special bonuses for executing a task
successfully.
Although no exact amount of reward could be ascertained for specific
tasks, one can assume that it must be substantial because some BLA
activists have lately built new houses in Dalbandin, Naushki, Kohlu,
Sibi, Khuzdar and Dera Bugti. Also, quite a few young Baloch activists
have recently acquired new, flashy SUVs.
Oddly enough, there is also an unusual indicator for measuring the
newfound wealth of some Baloch activists. In the marriage ceremonies
the dancing troupes of eunuchs and cross-dressers are raking in much
heavier shower of currency notes than before.
Based on the geographic spread of training camps, one can say that
there is a triangle of extreme instability in Balochistan. This
triangle can be drawn on the map by taking Barkhan, Bibi Nani (Sibi)
and Kashmore as three cardinal points.
There is another, larger, triangle that affords a kind of cushion for
the first triangle. It is formed by Naushki, Wana (in NWFP) and
Kashmore. Actually, landscape of Balochistan is such that it offers
scores of safe havens, inaccessible to outsiders.
Starting from the coastline, there are Makran Coastal Range, Siahan
Range, Ras Koh, Sultan Koh and Chagai Hills that are cutting the land
in east-west direction. In the north-south direction, we find Suleman
Range, Kithara Range, Palma Range and Central Ravi Range to complete
the task of forming deep and inaccessible pockets. Few direct routes
are possible between the coastline and upper Balochistan. Only two
roads connect Balochistan with the rest of the country.
Apart from the triangles of instability that we have mentioned there
is an arc – a wide, slowly curving corridor – of extensive activity.
It is difficult to make out as to who is doing what in that corridor.
Here is how to draw this arc-corridor on the map: Mark the little
Afghan towns of Shah Ismail and Ziarat Sultan Vais Qarni on the map.
Then mark the towns of Jalq and Kuhak in Iran. Now, draw a slowly
arching curve to connect Shah Ismail with Kuhak and another curve to
connect Ziarat Sultan Vais Qarni with Jalq. The corridor formed by
these two curves is the scene of a lot of diverse activities and we
have been able to gather only some superficial knowledge about it. The
towns of Dalbandin and Naushki where foreign presence has become a
matter of routine are located within this corridor.
Different entities are making different uses of this corridor. Despite
employing some local help, we could find very little about the kind of
activity that is bubbling in this corridor.
We found that the Indian consulate in Zahidan, Iran, has hired a house
off Khayaban Danishgah, near Hotel Amin in Zahidan. This house is used
for accommodating some people who cross over from Afghanistan to
Pakistan and from Pakistan to Iran through the arched corridor we have
described. But who are those people and what are they doing, we could
not find.
We also found that although Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards), the
trusted force directly under the control of Khamnei, are monitoring
Zahidan-Taftan road, there is no regular check post of Pasdaran on the
road between Khash and Jalq, making it easy for all kinds of elements
to cross here and there easily.
We also found that the border between Afghanistan and Iran is mostly
under the control of Pasdaran who come down hard on any illegal border
movement and that is why the arched corridor passing through Pakistan
is the favorite route for any individuals and groups including
American 'defence contractors' and their Afghan collaborators who may
have the need to go across or near the border of Iran. Not
surprisingly, part of this corridor is used by Iranians themselves
when they feel the need to stir some excitement in Pakistan. Iranians
also use the regular road of Zahidan-Quetta when they can find someone
with legal documents as was the case with an Iranian who has business
interests both in Pakistan and Iran and who came to Quetta just before
the start of 7 Jan trouble. He has not been heard of since then.
There is a coastal connection that also provides free access for
elements in Dubai and Oman to connect with militants in Balochistan.
This is a loosely defined route but there are three main landing
points in Balochistan:
1. Eastern lip of Gwadar Bay that lies in the Iranian territory but
affords easy crossover to Pakistan through unguarded land border;
2. Open space between Bomra and Khor Kalmat; and
3. Easternmost shoulder of Gwadar East Bay.
Some Indians, a curious mix of businessmen and crime mafia, came in
fishing boats from either Dubai or Oman and landed on the Gwadar Bay
in the Iranian territory before the start of 7 January eruptions. From
there they traveled to Khuzdar and then Quetta where they met with
some Baloch militants. It is rumored in those areas that the Indians
came with heavy amounts of cash but there was no way of verifying it.
They were escorted both ways by some Sarawani Balochs who run their
own fishing vessels.
Simultaneously, there were reports from our Washington correspondent
that some 'sources' in Pentagon had been trying to 'leak' the story to
the media that Americans and Israelis were carrying joint reccee
operations inside Iran and for that purpose they were using Pakistani
soil as launching point. The lead was finally picked and disseminated
by Seymour Hersh of The New Yorker.
However, from our own observations in the area we could not confirm
this report although there is a possibility that the curving corridor
that we have identified may have been used by the Americans and
Israelis to travel from Afghanistan into Pakistan and then into Iran
and back for this purpose although this is mere speculation, based on
the movement of foreigners in this area, and we can neither confirm
nor deny the substance of this report.
Also, there was some buzz, as reported by our correspondent in New
Delhi, that some high circles were questioning the wisdom of two-faced
policy of engaging Islamabad in peace dialogue while at the same time
supporting insurgent activity in Balochistan. It was also not clear as
to why Iran would be interested in stirring trouble in Balochistan
when it was faced by an imminent war from the American side and it
needed all the allies it could muster on its side and one of those
allies could possibly be Pakistan.
It was also difficult to reconcile Iranian involvement in Balochistan
with the fact that Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, that is a crucial
project for Iran, was in the final stages of negotiation and there
seemed no logical point in sending mixed signals by creating
difficulties in Balochistan.
These were some of the questions that we took to Misha and Sasha and
here is the explanation they gave. Their answers came in bits and
pieces but we have reconstructed their replies in the form of one
coherent interview:
Question: What was the purpose of Russian invasion of Afghanistan?
Misha: The Soviet Union was not in love with Afghanistan itself and by
now everyone must have understood it. We, or at least our leaders,
wanted a convenient corridor to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean --
the idea was to first establish full control in Kabul and from there
to raise the double-bogey of Pakhtunistan and Greater Balochistan and
try to detach at least a part of Balochistan from Pakistan and to
either merge it as a new province of Afghanistan or to create a new
country that should be under the firm control of Moscow. That would
have solved most of the problems facing Kremlin.
Question: When you helped create BLA back in the 1980's, what
objectives did you have in mind?
Sasha and Misha: It was simply an instrument to create problems in
Pakistan. There were no ideological reasons – it was merely a
pragmatic solution for a strategic problem.
Question: Who could have revived BLA after so many years of inactivity?
Misha: Most likely, Pentagon. With good lot of support from Kremlin.
You should keep in mind that reviving such an organization is a tricky
task and it needs active support from a number of players. Pentagon
and Kremlin would not be able to do much without some help from RAW
that has hundreds of active contacts all over Balochistan. Russia
could have helped negotiate the involvement of Balach Marri in the
project.
Sasha: RAW must have jumped at the chance because last July the
'discretionary grants' budget [a euphemism for espionage fund] was
increased by 700% in the Indian consulates in Kandahar, Jalalabad and
Zahidan.
Misha: Yes, discretionary grants are not subject to central audit and
the station chief can do what he wants with it.
Sasha: Balach possibly came to head the revived BLA through Russian
facilitation but you cannot say the same for Sardar Ataullah Mengal.
He returned from his self imposed exile in London and established his
headquarters in Kohlu. Was it a mere coincidence? I don't think so. In
all probability, he is the American man to keep a check on Balach
because Americans can never fully trust Russians.
Question: From your comments it appears that Balach and Mengal are
heading the resurrected BLA and the BLA has been revived by the
Americans and Russians to create trouble in Balochistan but could you
give us any coherent reasons for going to such great lengths for
disturbing Pakistan that is supposed to be a frontline ally of the
United States on its war against terrorism?
Misha and Sasha: [Misha laughed so hard that tears came to his eyes
while Sasha merely kept smiling in an absentminded way] – Frontline
ally? Are you kidding? Americans are using Pakistan and Pakistanis
would soon find it out if they have not already. Americans don't need
that kind of allies and they have made it abundantly clear for anyone
who can read their policy goals correctly. Let them deal with Iran and
you would see. If there can be any desirable American ally in that
region, that is Iran – Iran under a different regime, and they are
working to that end. Except for Balochistan, the rest of Pakistan is
useless for them.
Question: It is still not clear from your answer as to what do the
Pentagon and Kremlin hope to achieve by stirring trouble in
Balochistan?
Sasha: Americans have two long-term policy objectives in that region:
First, create a safe and reliable route to take all the energy
resources of Central Asia to the continental United States, and
second, to contain China.
Misha: Balochistan offers the shortest distance between the Indian
ocean and the Central Asia, that is to say, shortest distance outside
of the Gulf. The moment the conditions are ripe, Americans would like
to take all the oil and gas of Central Asia to Gwadar or Pasni and
from there to the United States.
Question: If the Americans are interested in creating safe channel for
shipping energy resources through Balochistan, why would they
encourage trouble there?
Misha: That is for now. By inciting trouble, they would effectively
discourage Trans-Afghan Pipeline or any other project that is intended
for sending Central Asian resources to South Asia. They are not
interested in strengthening the South Asian economies by allowing them
to obtain sensibly priced oil and gas. They would be more interested
in taking all they can to their own country and let everyone else
starve if that is the choice.
Sasha: The Americans would also like to discourage China from entering
into more development projects in Balochistan than it already has. By
developing the Gwadar port and roads in Balochistan, China is
ultimately helping itself by creating a convenient conduit for
commerce that would connect China concurrently with Central Asia,
South Asia, and all-weather Balochistan ports. The space is limited –
where China gains, America loses, and where America gains, China
loses.
Question: OK. This sounds plausible. But what interest could Russia
have in helping Pentagon in this trouble-Balochistan project?
Sasha: Russia has its own policy goals and as far as the present phase
of creating trouble in Balochistan is concerned, American and Russian
goals are not in conflict with each other. Russia wants to maintain
its monopoly over all the energy resources of Central Asia. At
present, the Central Asian countries are dependent entirely on Russia
for export of their gas project succeeds, it would open the floodgates
of exodus. Central Asian countries would understandably rush to the
market that pays 100% in cash and pays better price than Russia. It is
therefore very clear that by keeping Balochistan red hot, Russia can
hope to discourage Trans-Afghan pipeline or any other similar
projects. Russian economy in its present form is based on the monopoly
of Gazprom and if Gazprom goes under, so will the Russian economy at
some stage.
Question: So far, there is some sense in what you have said but how
would explain Indian involvement in the Balochistan revolt?
Sasha: India has its own perceived or real objectives. For instance,
India would go to great lengths to prevent Pakistan from developing a
direct trade and transportation route with Central Asia because it
would undermine the North-South corridor that goes through Iran. Also,
while the acute shortage of energy may have compelled India to extend
limited cooperation to Pakistan, the preferable project from Indian
point of view still remains the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.
Misha: Moreover, you cannot ignore the fact that India is preparing to
use Afghanistan as its main artery system to connect with Central Asia
and it would not allow Pakistan to share this sphere if it can.
Question: What about Iran? Why should Iran be a party to it?
Misha: Iran has incurred great expenses to develop Chah Bahar, the
port that is supposed to be the Iranian answer to Pakistani ports of
Gwadar and Pasni. Iran has also done lot of work to create excellent
road link between Herat and Chah Bahar. All this would go to waste if
Pakistani route comes on line because it is shorter and offers quick
commuting possibilities between Central Asia and Indian Ocean.
Sasha: At the same time you need to allow certain margin of
unreliability when dealing with Iran. You cannot be sure whether they
mean what they are saying and you cannot be sure whether they would
keep their promises. They do what suits them best and to hell with any
commitments. I am sorry but that is how I judge Iran.
Question: While both of you have given some explanation of American,
Russian, Iranian and Indian involvement in Balochistan, what is the
role of Afghanistan?
Sasha: There are many influential circles in Afghanistan that are
deadly opposed to Pakistan for one reason or the other. While
Afghanistan as a country may not be harboring any ill will against
Pakistan, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that some power
circles would not be inclined to damage Pakistan wherever they can. It
is clear from the recent developments that as India, Iran and
Afghanistan have made great strides to form some kind of economic,
trade and transportation alliance, all efforts have been made to
exclude Pakistan from any such deal.
Question: While BLA is being used by a number of power players for
their own objectives, does it have any potential, even as a byproduct,
to serve the cause of Baloch people?
Misha and Sasha: BLA is not the only fish in the pond. There is Baloch
Ittehad and there is PONAM and there is lots of small fry out there.
But none of them can be expected to do any good to the Balochi people
because the command this time is mostly in the hands of Baloch Sardars
and they have no past record of bringing any benefit to their own
people. If anything, they are known to sell their own people down the
river.
[Misha thumbed through a dog-eared file and read]
Sardar Mehrulla Marri sold all mineral and petroleum rights of Khatan
region to the British government in 1885 for a paltry sum of Rs. 200
per month. There was no time limit to this agreement – it was, as they
say, in perpetuity.
In 1861, Jam of Bela allowed the British government to put a telegraph
line through his territory, thus helping substantially the British
government in consolidating its control over large areas of
Balochistan. He received less than Rs. 900 per month for this
disservice to his own people and took the responsibility to safeguard
the telegraph line. In 1883, the Khan of Kalat sold the Quetta
district and adjoining territories to the British government. This was
an outright sale. The agreement that was signed in Dasht, included the
provision that the heirs and successors of Khan of Kalat would also be
bound by the same agreement. He received annual grant of Rs. 25000 for
selling the most attractive part of Balochistan to the British
government.
In the same year, the British government paid Rs. 5500 to the Bugti
Sardar for his cooperation although it was not specified as to what
kind of cooperation he extended to the British government.
While the Baloch Sardars were enthusiastically selling Balochistan to
the British government, there was no support to the idea of Pakistan
whereas the ordinary Balochs gave full approval for Pakistan. Any
positive development in Balochistan would go against the interests of
Sardars and only a fool would expect them to do anything for the good
of their people. Bear in mind that Marri and Mengal Sardars first
stood up against the Pakistan government when the law was passed to
abolish Sardari system in Balochistan to free the ordinary Balochs
from the clutches of their tribal leaders.
Question: The way the things are progressing in Balochistan, what
could be the likely outcome?
Misha: If no strong action is taken for another few months, the result
could be bifurcation of Pakistan.
Question: Is that the only likely outcome?
Misha: No. In fact, that is the farthest possible scenario but that
could eventually happen if Pakistan fails to assess, analyze and
address the situation quickly. For example, I have yet to see any
Pakistani effort to contact the ordinary Balochs. They are still
trying to woo the same Sardars who are living on the blackmail money
since the creation of Pakistan.
Sasha: I am surprised at the way Pakistan goes about tackling this
problem. During my few years in Afghanistan when I was engaged with
Balochistan, I found that while Baloch Sardars would sell their
loyalties and anything else at the drop of a hat, ordinary Balochs are
stupidly patriotic. They are hard to buy and harder to manipulate. If
I were a Pakistan government functionary, I would gather enough
ordinary, educated Balochs to counter the Sardar influence and deflate
this whole insurgency balloon.
Question: Both of you were, let's say, among the developers of the
original BLA. Do you find any differences between the original and the
present BLA?
Misha and Sasha: Plenty. Original BLA was mostly led by the young
people and Baloch Sardars had very little to do with it but the
present BLA is concentrated in the hands of Sardars.
The present movement in Balochistan, led by BLA, PONAM and Baloch
Ittehad is a mismatched concoction of ancient and modern.
They are trying to run a modern media campaign but there are crucial
gaps in that effort. Ours were different times and we could do without
media support. They have created a list of Pakistani journalists who
are supposed to be sympathetic to any move against the government and
they are feeding them daily a mixture of truth and lies, a practice
that has been perfected by the Pentagon.
They managed to bring some Baloch women in Dera Bugti but the results
would be little if they cannot repeat the performance in most other
areas of Balochistan.
They have built their campaign around a single incident – the Sui
gang-rape – and if the Government is smart enough, it would hang the
real culprits and ask the victim of the rape to announce publicly that
she was satisfied with the justice meted out to the criminals and that
would take all the wind out of the sails of the BLA campaign. A real
hard campaign needs to be built around much broader and hard to solve
issues.
Question: Hypothetically speaking, if the Pakistan government asked
your advice, what would you suggest?
Sasha: The options are few. They should abolish Sardari system
immediately and crack down powerfully on the private armies. As far as
I know, the constitution of Pakistan does not allow Sardari system and
private armies and there would be no legal questions if those laws are
implemented with the full help of state power.
Misha: They should involve broadest possible range of ordinary Balochs
in the dialogue. The can find enough educated youth in Marri and
Mengal tribes to match the influence of tribal leaders. They should
also allow the fragments of Bugti tribe to return to their ancestral
lands and that would be enough to calm down the ageing and eccentric
Bugti who pretends to be the leader of that tribe.
Sasha: Pakistan government should hasten the development process in
the province because it would open job opportunities and that would
allow the escape hatch to ordinary Balochs to distance themselves from
their leaders.
Misha: They should try to cut down the sources and channels of supply
of arms and cash to insurgents.
