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Indian Army Officer Corps

--- This is excellent reading especially for those interested in military history.It deals at length the social interactions of 'native' Indian officers with their British colleagues in the changing social/political scenarios of the sub-continent.   This is a piece about the pioneers of Indian officer corps when it was opened for natives.  It is for only those interested in military history.  It was published in Bangladesh Defence Journal, September 2011.      Indian Army Officer Corps – Social Panorama Hamid Hussain East India Company (EIC) army in India consisted of Indian soldiers known as sepoys and British officers.  This arrangement continued when the Crown took direct control of Indian affairs in 1858.  An intermediate cadre of Indian officers later known as Viceroy's Commissioned Officers (VCOs) were a link between Indian soldiers and British officers, however even the senior most VCO was subordinate to the junior most British officer.  First World War opened the doors for Indians in the officer corps of Indian army.  However, only a small number of Indians were commissioned as officers and this trend continued until Second World War when large numbers of Indians were commissioned for an expanded Indian army to fulfill Imperial defense responsibilities all over the globe.  One the eve of First World War, the bulk of Indian army was recruited from northern India.  This recruitment policy was based on then prevalent 'Martial Race Theory' suggesting that only certain races were good soldiers.  Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims, Jats, Rajputs, Dogras, Gurkhas and Pathans were elevated to the martial races while inhabitants of South India and Bengal were considered Non-Martial.  Soldiers were mainly from rural background with very little or no education.  When it was decided to open Indian army officer corps to Indians, British were faced with a dilemma.  The more educated Indians from Bengal and south India had not been recruited for decades as they were considered 'non-martial'.  The preferred martial races were way behind in education and therefore not suitable for officer cadre.  Now that officer ranks were grudgingly opened for India, the door was opened for non-martial Indians as they had the essential qualification of education. Several factors contributed to grooming of those young Indian men from different religious and ethnic communities who decided to join Indian army as officers.  The first Indians to be commissioned as officers belonged to Native Indian Land Forces (NILF) and Imperial Cadet Corps (ICC): an exclusive club for only scions of princely and aristocratic families.  Majority of them faded away quickly and only a handful later reached higher ranks.   It is interesting to note that the first batch of five Indians selected for training at Sandhurst in 1918 had only one candidate Sardar Madanjit Singh  from Punjab; the home of Indian army.  Syed Iskander Ali Mirza was from Bombay (he was descendent of Nawab family of Murshidabad in Bengal but was brought up by his mother in Bombay to keep him away from the court's intrigues), Iqbal Ali Beg was from Madras while Tarun Kumar Sinha and Lolit Kumar Roy were from Bengal.  Only one candidate Mirza was commissioned from this first batch.  The batch of five commissioned in July 1921 consisted of two from Bombay (Kumar Shri Himatsinhji and Kumar Shri Rajendrasinhji) one each from Central India (Nawab Sarwar Ali Khan), Punjab (Daya Singh Bedi) and North West Frontier Province (Sahibzada Faiz Muhammad Khan).   In view of many handicaps including a small number of vacancies allotted to Indians at Sandhurst, strict selection criteria, living far away from home, cost of education at Sandhurst and cultural adjustment resulted in a very small number of Indians graduating from Sandhurst and continuing a successful career in Indian army.  Experiences of these pioneers were quite diverse.  Review of lives of few of these officers and their subsequent military career gives insight into the life of this first generation of Indian officers.  Some spent only a short career in the army while others made army their home ending their careers as senior officers in Indian and Pakistani armies.  The first Indian graduate from Sandhurst Syed Iskander Ali Mirza was commissioned on July 16, 1920.  Officers destined for Indian army spent their first year with a British battalion.  Mirza was posted to Second Battalion of Scottish Rifles.  He was the first Indian officer to serve with British on equal basis and this caused uproar in some circles.  The issue caused a prolonged struggle among Indian army brass, Viceroy's Army Council, War Office in London and Secretary of State of India.   This dragged on for six months and finally Mirza was able to join the British battalion in January 1921.  After a year with British battalion, Mirza joined his parent regiment 17th Poona Horse (he joined 33rd Cavalry but around the same time reorganization of Indian army was under way and 33rd Cavalry and 34th Cavalry were amalgamated to form 17th Poona Horse).  He only remained with his regiment for four years and transferred to Indian Political Service (IPS) in August 1926.  He later became Governor General and President of Pakistan.  Mirza Riaz Ali Baig had the unique background of combination of family military service and high education. He was from a respectable Hyderabad family.  His grandfather served as a Rissaldar in Royal Deccan Horse.  His father was an educated government servant and rose to become the first Indian to become Vice President of Council of India in London.  He moved his family to London and Baig lived in England from 1910 to 1923 attending the prestigious Clifton school.  He was selected for Sandhurst and after commission joined elite 16th Light Cavalry in 1925.  For the first time in his life he experienced racial prejudice when he came close to British in military setting.  He along with two other Indian officers (Faiz Muhammad Khan and Sheodat Singh) lived in a separate bungalow called 'native quarters'.  He resigned his commission in 1930.  He was more of an intellectual bent and felt constrained by highly disciplined military life; however his personal unhappy experience in the army due to racial bias probably was the main reason for his resignation.  Later, he served a long career in Indian diplomatic corps.  Kumar Shri Rajendrasinhji was from the princely Jadeja family of Nawannagar.  He joined the elite 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse) and had a successful military career.  He was the first Indian officer to win Distinguished Service Order (DSO) in Second World War.  He ended his career as chief of Army Staff of Indian army. One of the last batches of Indians trained at Sandhurst in 1932 (commissioned in January 1934) consisted of cadets selected from different backgrounds.  Two were from princely states; Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan from Pataudi and Nawabzada Saleem Khan from Sachin state and three were representatives of traditional martial races; one Pushtun (Akbar Khan) and two Sikhs (Ajit Singh and Ghanshiam Singh).  B. M. Kaul, Pran Nath Naranag, Rajendra Nath Nehra, Suryakant Kumar, Muhammad Abdul Latif Khan, Muhammad Usman and Shahid Hamid were representatives of newly empowered middle class in government service and no family history of  military service.  British encouraged traditional elites including landlords, members of civil service, police and army to educate their children so that they could qualify for commission.  These classes were in service of the government for a long time and in return prospered under Imperial patronage.  Members of these classes joining army as officers ensured continued loyalty of the Indian officer corps.  This also diminished chances of subversion by newly emerging nationalist politics.  In 1932, it was decided to start an Indian Military Academy to train officers in India and in December 1932, first batch of 40 cadets started their training.  British authorities maintained a careful balance in the selection.  Fifteen were selected by open competition, fifteen were selected from army ranks and ten were from state forces.  The first batches of Indian Commissioned Officers (ICOs) faced discrimination even from fellow Indian officers who attended Sandhurst and known as King Commissioned Indian Officers (KCIOs).  In 1934, when two Sikh ICOs joined 3rd Cavalry there was a debate whether they should be allowed to eat in the mess.  3rd Cavalry was Indianized in 1932 and several KCIOs (Iftikhar Khan, Shahid Hamid, K. P. Dhargalkar, P. C. Banerjee, P. S. Nair, K. K. Varma and Nawabzada Agha Raza) were already serving in the regiment.  Indian officers own background and most importantly conduct of the Commanding Officer (CO) determined how well the Indian officer adjusted to his new role.  A confident lad supported by a good CO was able to move on smoothly while a hesitant young man landing in a regiment with bad CO had lot of problems and that invariably affected his career.  Koodendera Subayya Thimayya (nick named Timmy) was a Coorg; a small tribal community in the hilly area of South India.  Coorgs were considered a 'Martial Race' by British.  He was one of the first Indian students educated at St. Joseph's College at Coonoor and later he studied at Bishop Cotton's school in Bangalore.  He attended Military College at Dehra Dun to prepare for Sandhurst.  Indian cadets at Sandhurst had set their own rules to counter some of the handicaps and discriminations.  The rules included giving double tips, always using expensive balcony seats at the theatre and not attending the grand ball at the academy just before commissioning (they were either unable to dance or not able to bring a girl for the dance).  Thimayya broke the rule and became the first Indian to attend the ball.  He spent his first year with 2nd Battalion of Highland Light Infantry (HLI).  He was the first Indian with the Highlanders but they treated him with respect and his year with them was very pleasant.  British officers introduced him into the exclusively British social circle and he interacted with British ladies.  HLI officers didn't know that Bangalore United Services Club was only for British and Indians were not allowed to be members.  Timmy's Commanding Officer Lt. Colonel Sir Robert Seagraves took his case to the Club Committee but was voted down.  HLI officers decided to resign from the club but Timmy persuaded them not to do so.  In fact, Timmy fared much better in HLI than other two English subalterns.  After completing a year with HLI, Timmy was posted to his parent battalion 4/19 Hyderabad Regiment.  Timmy's CO Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton Britton was especially kind to Timmy and once told him, "Timmy, you're the son I might have had'.  Britton forced British exclusive Basra Club to allow membership to his Indian officers.  Timmy's wife Nina spent part of her childhood in France.  She was pretty, educated, spoke fluent French and felt comfortable socializing with British.  Timmy and Nina were fully accepted in British society because of their unique background and they in turn felt fully comfortable in British company.  Timmy was the poster child of a successful Indian officer.  The experience of Captain Kunwar Daulat Singh was totally opposite.  Daulat was a Rajput from the royal house of Kotah.  He was commissioned in December 1919 from the Temporary School for Indian Cadets (TSIC).  In 1927, he was the senior most Indian officer with 4/19 Hyderabad Regiment at the rank of Captain.  He was a good soldier and intelligent man but had extreme negative views about British.  British officers in turn were not very fond of him.  He was not hesitant to confront fellow British officers at even the minor slight.  He was conservative and religious and was observant of all religious rituals.  After the day's routine, he would change to dhoti (loin cloth) and always ate native food.  His wife was with him in the cantonment but she was kept in purdah (not appearing in public without covering the face).  He soon left the army or more correctly hounded out.  Experience of Shahid Hamid with 3rd Cavalry in 1934 is another example of how early experience set the stage.  Shahid's one year stint with British Regiment (Prince of Wales Volunteers) was very good.  He got along with officers very well, played polo and on completion of his one year, his CO wrote in his report that if allowed he would like to keep this officer permanently.  It was a British officer of 3rd Cavalry Harold Watkis who asked Shahid to join his regiment.  In 1922 reorganization, 5th Cavalry and 8th Cavalry were amalgamated to form 3rd Cavalry.  Officers of old regiments (all British) didn't like each other and even a decade after amalgamation they sat on opposite sides of the table in mess.   3rd Cavalry was Indianized in 1932 and all British officers thought that this had diminished the prestige of the regiment thus creating a gulf between British and Indian officers.  In the process of Indianization, several Indian officers from other regiments were posted to 3rd Cavalry (Iftikhar Khan from 7th Cavalry, K. K. Varma from 16th Cavalry and K. P. Dhargalkar from an infantry 4/12 Frontier Force Regiment).   These Indian officers were not happy to leave their parent regiments.  CO Colonel Julian D Wilton was not popular with all the officers.  There was no camaraderie among officers and regimental bond was not strong.  Shahid had not only problems with his CO but also with fellow British as well Indian officers.  This was the main reason that he decided to transfer to Royal Indian Army Service Corps (RIASC).  Demands of Second World War opened the doors of Indian army wide for Indians.  In five short years, nine thousand Indians were given emergency commission and these officers were called Indian Emergency Commissioned Officers (IECOs).  In 1945, over seven thousand Indian officers were serving in combat arms while over eight thousand were serving in non-combat arms.  Most of IECOs would have ended their careers at the end of the war but imminent departure of British and need for native officer corps for successor Indian and Pakistani states resulted in retention of many IECOs.  By the end of Second World War, there were three main categories of Indian officers; KCIOs, ICOs and IECOs.  KCIOs considered themselves as elite and a select lot and some ridiculed ICOs as 'Dehra Dun pansies'.  Those officers who started their careers in the ranks were considered at the bottom of the social class of officers and even ridiculed by their brother ICOs.  IECOs were also not considered equals by KCIOs and ICOs and generally viewed as being able to get into the army due to relaxation of all standards.  IECOs only had six months of training before getting their commission.  This was due to the necessity of rapid expansion of officer corps during Second World War.  Indian officer corps was not monolithic.  Socially, Indian officers on the eve of independence can be subdivided into several categories; 1-      Scions of Princely families i.e. General Rajendra Sinhji, Major General Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan Pataudi, Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan. 2-      Young men from urban middle class families entering through open competition with no tradition of military service, i.e. General Yahya Khan. 3-      Educated young men from mainly rural backgrounds with long tradition of military service.  Most were sons of VCOs but they got their education before entering military academy, i.e. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, Lieutenant General Azam Khan, Major General Iftikhar Khan. 4-      Men who served several years in the ranks before becoming officers.  These men also had long family tradition of military service but had little education and were much older when they joined military academy.  They were groomed at Kitchener College at Nowgong before entering Dehra Dun.  This preparation helped them both in terms of education as well as refined them socially to ease their transition from soldiers to officers, i.e. General Musa Khan, General Tikka Khan.  5-      Men from communities that had no tradition of military service and soldiers were not recruited from these communities.  Major General Ishfakul Majid (an Assamese Muslim), Major General Shahid Hamid (a Muslim from Lucknow), Major General O.A. Mitha (member of Memon business community), Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw (member of Parsee business community). All Indian officers were westernized to a certain extent due to the very nature of their profession as well as close association with British officers.  It invariably had impact on the personal life as well as religious outlook of the officers.  However, there were several shades of this westernization.   Officers from rural and culturally conservative areas were westernized up to the limits of cantonments.  They generally had simpler life style.  On the other hand more Anglicized officers were as good as any British in their personal life in manners, dress and food.  Many religious and cultural taboos were broken by majority of officers.  Thimayya was assigned to Muslim Ahir company of 4/19 Hyderabad Regiment.  He learned Hindustani from his sepoys and ate their food.  Mitha was assigned to Hindu Jat company of 2/4 Bombay Grenadiers.  He mixed freely with his soldiers and ate their meals.  In case of Muslims, some enjoyed their gin and soda in private and more discreetly (i.e. Ayub Khan) while others felt comfortable drinking publicly (i.e. Yahya Khan).  Many Hindu officers broke the centuries old tradition of prohibition of consumption of meat.  Musa Khan (6/13 Frontier Force Rifles) and B. M. Kaul (5/6 Rajputana Rifles) were friends from their subalterns days right up to independence in 1947.  Both shared meals, something that could have horrified their parents.  A deeply religious Muslim Musa sharing meal with a high caste Brahmin Kaul was not earth shattering in concept but was not common among general population of India.   Many Hindu officers had Muslim batmen while Muslim officers had Hindu batmen cooking and serving meals that was almost unheard among general population.  Decades after partition, a senior retired Pakistan army officer had some of his old Dehra Dun Hindu officers of Indian army as his guests in Pakistan.  In deference to Hindu religious prohibitions, he had vegetarian meals arranged in one room and meat dishes were in another room.  Looking at the all vegetarian dishes, his Hindu friends inquired about the meat stating that they had not come all the way from India to eat vegetables.  They all went to the room where meat dishes were arranged and partook from the 'forbidden' to their heart's content.  A small percentage remained deeply religious in personal life even in their 20s (i.e. General Musa Khan, Lieutenant General Nathu Singh).  In case of female emancipation, there were two main factors; one female education and second leaving the segregation and participating in mixed gatherings.  Majority of Indian army officers were instrumental in educating their female family members.  Females of majority of Muslim households and Hindu Rajputs were restricted to homes.   Some officers despite being personally westernized still preferred to keep their wives in 'purdah' (i.e. Nathu Singh, Ayub Khan). One reason may be that their wives were not literate and from conservative rural backgrounds making adjustment to a highly westernized military cantonment environment very difficult if not impossible.  During the Raj and for several decades after independence, army officers were high up on the social ladder and most desirable candidates for marriage.  This provided an opportunity of breaking down of some social barriers and in some cases even religious barriers.  Young officers from humbler backgrounds such as sons of soldiers predominantly from rural backgrounds and from urban lower middle class being the most desirable bachelors were sought by traditional aristocracy of landlords, nascent professional class and members of the Raj administration as well as princely states.  We see many examples of wealthy landlords, highly educated aristocratic and professional families such as doctors marrying their daughters to young officers from humbler backgrounds.  This helped in breaking many social especially caste taboos.  Some officers became thoroughly Anglicized due to their peculiar background of early education at convent schools in India (i.e. Thimayya) or education in England (Russi Bilimoria, J. N. Chaudhri).  Most of them were fully integrated in British company due to their manners and some like Thimayya became excellent dancers on the ballroom floor.  Some officers completely identified with British and avoided anything 'native'.  They were sometimes called 'Brindian'.  Iftikhar Khan, J. N. Chaudhri and K. P. Dhargalkar were representatives of this class.  Chaudhri when instructor at Staff College at Quetta didn't interact with Indian officers or students.  His wife Kukoo also kept a distance from natives.  Their behavior was irritating for all other Indian officers and students and they resorted to boycott the couple.  On the other end of the spectrum, the world of officer corps was opened to the least educated and very conservative class of India.  One example will show the enormous adjustment problem for both the Indian officers and their spouses of this class.  Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon enlisted as soldier and spent three years in an infantry battalion (4/14 Punjab Regiment).  Light machine gun section of infantry battalions had mules for transport and every soldier was rotated to take care of the mules.  Gurbaksh on his turn also performed this duty while his wife Basant helped him in polishing the mule saddle.  Gurbaksh qualified for Dehra Dun and after successfully completing his training was commissioned as an officer in 1/14 Punjab Regiment.  One can easily imagine the psychological barrier that Gurbaksh and his wife had to cross as the worlds of sepoy and officer were poles apart.  On the other hand, an officer from a princely family had interaction with British on a different social level.  One example is of Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan Pataudi.  As a child he visited Governor House where his family was guest of the governor and played with children of the governor.  Such officers were more comfortable and had less adjustment problems.  One can easily visualize enormous adjustment problems for British officers.  A British officer interacting with the sepoy Gurbaksh taking care of the battalion's mule is now asked to accept him as brother officer and equal in the mess.  The British officer was much more comfortable with scions of princely families like Rajendra Sinhji, Sher Ali Khan and Yaqub Khan as well as less blue blooded but more Anglicized officers like Chaudhri, Thimayya and Atiq ur Rahman.  Relationship with officers commissioned from the ranks such as Gurbaksh, Tikka Khan, Musa Khan was official but not very close in view of huge social gulf.   It is to the credit of British officers that majority of them adjusted adequate enough for the Indian army to come out of the cauldron of Second World War with good reputation.  Despite lingering racial prejudice in all other areas, army broke many racial barriers first.  In most cases, if Indian officer was confident and social enough, he was generally well accepted by his British colleagues.  On the other hand, sons of VCOs had only professional interaction with British and due to inhibitions on both Indian and British side had very little family interactions.  However, it is quite obvious that the simple fact of British being the rulers and Indians as subjects was facing Indian officers of all classes at every corner.  Second World War was a catalyst for both rapid Indianization as well as smooth integration of the officer corps.  Many factors such as large scale induction of British officers through emergency commissions with no or much less pre-conceived prejudices against Indians, British and Indian officers serving together in combat, good performance of many Indian officers in war and lead role played by C-in-C Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck in advancing Indian officers cause helped to integrate British and Indian officers in the army with very little friction.  The problem of adjustment persisted even after the departure of British and many struggled to bridge the gap.  Sam Manekshaw caused uproar when he was commanding National Defence Services Staff College.  He remarked that he will not allow any officer in the academy whose wife looked like an 'aya' (female servant).  In 1947, Pakistan Military Academy was established at Kakul with a small staff.  Two highly educated sisters from an aristocratic family of Bhopal were married to Deputy Commandant Colonel M. A. Latif (later Major General) and a company Commander Major Abid Bilgrami (later Major General).  Commandant of the Academy Brigadier F. B. Ingall made sure that ladies club activities were all inclusive including wives who remained in 'purdah'. In case of Pakistan, a certain class difference existed even among second generation of officers.  Sons of officers who joined army were brought up in an urban environment and educated in convent schools.  Naturally they were comfortable speaking English and more modern in their outlook.  On the other hand officers who were sons of Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) had their early education and grooming in a rural environment.  They were more conservative and not very outgoing.  Sons of officers tend to be alumni of Cadet Colleges at Hassan Abdal and Kohat while the alma mater of sons of JCOs is Military College at Jehlum.  There is some social gap between these two groups that exists even today.  Some officers complain that present army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani has disproportionately promoted large number of officers to senior ranks that belong to his own alma mater Military College Jehlum.  The first generation of Indian officers had to cross many barriers but it also opened many doors that were closed to Indians of previous generation.  There is no doubt that Indian army provided a unique opportunity to young Indian men from humbler backgrounds to break the social barrier.  In case of India, a native of Madras P. P. Kumaramangalam and a Parsi Sam Manekshaw became army chiefs.  Both belonged to the so called 'Non-Martial races';   communities that did not preferred army as a profession and were excluded by British.  In case of Pakistan, there is no way that Ayub Khan, son of Rissaldar Major Mir Dad Khan of Hodson Horse could have become President, Musa Khan, son of Subedar Yazdan Bakhsh of Hazara Pioneers and Azam Khan son of Rissaldar Major Muhammad Akram Khan of Hodson Horse could have become governors or Yahya Khan son of Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Sadat Khan could have become army chief and President if it was not for the Indian army.  Selected Readings: 1-      Apurba Kundu.  Militarism in India: The Army and Civil Society in Consensus (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998) 2-      Pradeep P. Barua.  Gentlemen of the Raj: The Indian Army Officers Corps 1817-1949 (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2003) 3-      Daniel P. Marston.  Phoenix From The Ashes:  Indian Army in the Burma Campaign (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003) 4-      Lt. Colonel ® Gautam Sharma.  Nationalization of the Indian Army 1885-1947 (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Limited, 1996) 5-      Humayun Mirza.  From Plassey to Pakistan: The Family History of Iskandar Mirza (Lahore: Ferozsons, 2000, Pakistan Edition) 6-      Humphrey Evans.  Thimayya of India (Dehradun: Natraj Publishers, 2009 Reprint) 7-      Major General A. O. Mitha.  Unlikely Beginnings: A Soldier's Life (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003) 8-      Major General V K Singh.  Leadership in the Indian Army: Biographies of Twelve Soldiers (New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 2005) 9-      Major General ® Shahid Hamid.  General Ki Aaap Beeti (General's Autobiography).  In Urdu (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992) 10-  The INA Heroes – Autobiographies (Lahore: Hero Publications, 1946) 11-  Brigadier Francis Ingall.  The Last of The Bengal Lancers (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988) Bangladesh Defence Journal, September 2011

Statement of PA-6910 CAPT Farook Adam Khan, Sitara e Jurat Given at the Court Martial at ATTOCK FORT

WITHOUT COMMENTS Copy of  The Statement of PA-6910 CAPT Farook Adam Khan, Sitara e Jurat Given at the Court Martial  at  ATTOCK FORT   I find it very difficult to decide where to begin, however, I do find an extremely strange co-incidence in the fact that today is 12 Sep 1973. I was awarded Sitare Jurat for an action which took place exactly this very date on 12 Sep 1965. But that is all very well, and much water has flowed between then and now, and I am now constrained to say things in my defense that have to be in answer to a coterie of prosecution witness. Apparently the prosecution story starts from major Saleem Asghar, who in turn starts it from 18 June 1972, when i was supposed to have become outstandingly vocal in my criticism of the Army Leadership and the government. However Major Saleem Asghar did have the grace to correct himself when he admitted that 18 June was a meaning less date, and this attitude of mine had started in Dec 71 along with the other officers in the Battalion. He also admitted that it was not me who gave my version or opinion to others but these sentiments were expressed during general discussions in which he had held the same opinion as those attributed to me. What were these topic of discussions, and what sentiments were expressed may be relevant. I wish to speak this very briefly, for if any one says that he has learnt or heard any thing from me in private which was not meant to be heard in public, for all the world to hear, let me tell you that he is lying. I wonder if I need to describe the shock we all received on surrender of East Pakistan. I wonder again, if it is all necessary to describe the bitter taste that was left when the cease fire in the west was declared. Can I presume that you all would have felt the same, for you were all serving in the same Army, and had the same feelings for it, if not more. It is therefore, unnecessary to refer again to the weeping officers , I need not touch upon those two days when no officers in the unit were seen amongst the troops. I need not also mention the times i could not face my men and look them in their eyes because they invariably averted their eyes from mine;l and you all of course, would have also felt the same. Humiliation when drove on your home and were occasionally jeered at by civilians; and there is no need to mention some of these elite officers who removed star plates and formation flags when travelling to the cantonments for fear of identifying themselves with a statue and rank. All these facts are known.You know them. I know them. We all here know them for they left an indelible mark on us all. On some much much more than others. And I presume that you all know who were being generally blamed besides the politicians and the then regime. And I say openly to you all now sitting in judgement over me. Did you know that during those days all who bore red tapes on their collars were looked down upon. And was not the whole sordid episode of 1971 being discussed in each and every mess and langar? If many preferred to ignore this , or attempted to suppress it by letters and circulars then, yet again those responsible did not gauge the mood of the younger officers in the aftermath of that nightmarish Dec for fortnight.  It pains me to say that Corps of Generals in the Army figured very prominently in these discussions and invariably to their detriment. I am reminded of the time one senior officer remarked after one such session that there needs to be a " Society for the prevention of cruelty to Generals," so apt but so pathetic.  On second thought i shall spare myself the sheer frustration i will feel if i, once again narrate all the ills in the Army that I have had so much to say about, as this does not seem to be the place or the time or the occasion to do so. Suffice to say that I spoke and spoke with my heart and from my own experience, because I felt deeply for the Army. I have lived all my life in the shadow of military uniform and have always lived it deeply. It has been love that has lasted till 30th Mar 1973, when for the first time i truly realized what a fools world I had been living in and whatever depths the Army hierarchy had fallen during these past few years. That I shall touch upon later. One of the aftermath of 71 war was the lack of confidence in leadership, while I am reluctant to believe in total depravity of the corps of senior officers, it is a sad fact that the young officers place very little, if any, dependance on their honesty, truthfulness and competence. The majority of officers whom i have know personally or have heard about are petty minded mentally weak and wholly unfit. many are vulgar demagogues and past masters in the art of deceit, corruption, nepotism and narrow parochialism. The rest are men of narrow intellect, limited comprehension and even lesser professional ability. It is only the exception among them who deserves to be called a soldier. The vast majority of officers advance in rank only as they appease, bribe, seduce deceive or openly stoop down to lowest depths of immorality in order to manipulate their promotions, postings and appointments. If their daily transactions their decisive consideration has always been not whether their actions or decision are good for the comments but whether their actions or decisions are good for the command but whether they are popular with their seniors, particularly those who can influence their careers. I say these things because I can and am able to give you positive examples to substantiate each word that I have said here and have often spoken in the past for I can blame my own youthful inability to keep my mouth shut, but this prompts me to ask a question from myself; we, as the officer corps have been dabbed as patriots far more frequently than we have been called traitors. The question arises, can patriots, those steadfast defenders of the country against enemies in the field of battle, be still called patriots when in time of peace, they sit treacherously irresolute and quiescent before those equally dangerous foes that lurk in the shadow of all worse such as foes as greed, selfishness, short sightedness, blatant corruption and the sheer stupidity and cowardliness of backyard chair borne commanders. I do not normally sit in judgement on a man's morals or his taste, but till the day I die, I will sit in judgment on  a man's qualifications to wear same uniform that i wear, and that is as it should be.  And all this is answer to Salim Asghar and to a very honorable member of the court  who quoted an ARI to the effect that it was an offense to criticise senior officers. I am afraid i did express my opinions openly, without pulling any punches and without being sly or clandestine about it. I believe rightly or wrongly, that a man says what he must in spite of dangers or retribution and that, in my opinion is the basis of human morality. I have used words here that are far stronger that the ones I used prior to Marc 1973, but i use them now only to repeat what I said earlier, that NO ONE has heard words from me in private which all the world was not allowed to hear from me . If during these discussions sentiments were expressed that may have been objectionable, no ulterior motive over lay behind them. However, one must consider in what context such discussions took place. The vast bulk of criticism was directed at that way the army led during 71 War. Then in the initial stages the hopes and dreams we had about the army leadership that would not have surely learnt its lessons and would take drastic measures to eradicate what to us was so apparent. But lo and behold we were now told that we lost war because East Pakistani was a traitor, we were out numbered, the Russians had threatened, the Seventh Fleet had betrayed us, the junior leadership lacked dedication, the Jawans were not trained, patrolling was poor, field craft was faulty, siting of weapons wrong and so on and on, till now ultimates of ultimates" The planning was brilliant out in the execution the lower down we went in the chain of command the worst was the performance" so now we have a particular situation according to the esteemed senior officers the Junior echelons are terrible. Where are we in the lower strata -----? Well, we were not happy. But that was not the vital issue. The issue was, especially when enough breathing space was given what was done to ensure that this arm,y could now be converted into a fighting force from the rag tag militia that it was officered by the people that it did have and led by those that still do. Answer, Nothing. There was and being felt at the level that matters; those who do the actual fighting and the killing and very often, the dying. I remember one interrogator here at Attock who during the later stages of investigation of investigation remarked, while we were alone, that we the accused, had been sacrificed, which was a great pity, but this sacrifice would not go in vain. In his opinion the state of affairs in the army was bound to improve as a result of this affair. He was a Lt Col and the conversation took place in the middle of May, and it seems to me you have you have yet another disappointed officer on your hands. He however, will never speak. For him it shall always be others who will speak, if they dare and be destroyed. If in that process he can benefit he shall be pleased and will be thankful. That is the real sum character of your good officers, and the prudent have analysed the whole situation accurately. It is only among the younger lot that you will still find some who will tell you true unadulterated facts of life if you give them a chance; but i am afraid this sordid affair will dry up this source of information also. That was so painfully apparent when the prosecution paraded out letters before this court as our accusers in the garb of patriots. I do solemnly swear i would not exchange place for an single one of the witnesses that have come here. I would rather die having spoken in my manner than speak in their manner and live. Often in battle there can be no doubt that if a man throws away his arms and falls on his knees to beg before his enemies, he may escape death and in other difficult situations there are other ways of escaping harm___ and that is when a man is willing to say and do anything. All of us have already been condemned and destroyed as officers, but our accusers too have been condemned by the truth to suffer the penalty for sheer villainy and wrong. We all must abide with our reward, let them abide by theirs. I suppose that these things have been in our fate, and I think they are well written. Coming back to Salim Asghar and his allegations I wish to say at the outset, and with greatest vehemence at my command, that what Maj Salim Asghar had to say here has not been invented in my mind independently. When you talk about strange coincidence in this case, what could be stranger than the date, what he has selected on which I am supposed to have proposed to him to join me in an organisation to overthrow the government. On 21st Aug 72 is the date on which the GHQ letter about the retirement of Brig F. B. Ali and Col Aleem Afridi were issued. It is about a week after the retirement orders of those involved in the 6 Armed Affair. I simply cannot believe that the selection of this date can be coincidence. It fits into the plot. I had gone to great lengths proving our separate relationship in the unit at that time, and tried highlighting the sheer unavailability of these fantastic allegations. I really do not want to put across my argument at this stage but i still think it fair that i bring some points out in the open.  According to Major Salim Asghar these are four conspirators in one unit, and all are friends. However, he says, Capt Farook Adam Khan being the common dominator no two others ever mentioned any "Coup" or "organisation" in each others presence i have no comments to offer During the time Major Salim Asghar had served in the unit it is public knowledge that he invariably carried all gossip and criticism to his uncle, Gen Majid malik who normally mentioned these points to us. In addition Major Salim Asghar was and probably is, a very staunch defender of the good name and professional reputation of his uncle. Inspite of his request to be a competent prosecuted witness, he has the grace to admit that I had on a number of occasions, to my shame, asked him to check up about my posting to Jordan___ the latest query being as late as Jan 73. I wonder if I have to leave it to the court to draw its conclusions from this. Can there be any conspirational group in existence when the alleged "Rasputin" among them was seriously trying to get through a posting abroad? Brig Wajid Ali Shah was a frequent visitor to our unit, and had stayed for a number of meals informally with us, and we were out_ spoken enough to discuss matters of a professional nature freely and frankly with him. I never did, and need never have pre arranged any single lunch to get his "views". This is crude distortion of the truth. I am amazed at the embellishment attached to my request to him to pass a message to Maj Shahid Attaullah in Sialkot to take me to Jhelum also, in case Shahid was coming to Lahore to pick up his wife before leaving. In fact, it was major Saleem Asghar who lefty the message with duty clerk who had passed it in the form it was done ultimately. Major Satti and myself are good friends, we have talked of many things on many times, but i never did take him aside, asked my friend Maj Salim Asghar to act as witness, and then pop up the question of the day. That is nonsense.   And as he finished his testimony, Maj Asghar finally added insult to injury he called himself a friend of mine. In Sep I was to go and spend a week end with my brother in Jehlum. Capt Sarwar did know about this but I had not told him to invite or to inform. Lt Col S.A. Durrani himself admitted as much when being personally cross examined by Capt Sarwar. Apparently it was difficult to deny this when personally confronted. It pained me when he gave a totally contrary answer to a court question when asked to reexamine the incident in "hindsight." It pained me because it was so untrue and because I had held this officer in much high regard for such a long time. I had not invited Col Afridi and did not know where he was even staying at that time. As it often happened we were in the club, where Maj Saeed Akhtar Malik also joined us. The four of us stayed in the club drinking for a good three and a half hours, before we went to Major Farooq Nawaz Janjuas' house. Capt Sarwar had told me that Lt Col Durrani may also drop in so we left message for him and told one of the Chowkidars to guide him if necessary. By the time we arrived at Farooq'a house we were already criticizing bitterly and fairly loudly and bitterly. If that amounted to conspiracy we should well have been arrested in the Club where adequate number of witnesses were available. By the time Durrani arrived we were fairly heated discussion. Col Afridi had dropped in Iftikhar's place while we were sitting in Farook's house. He had then been called over to join us for dinner___ which was one reason for dinner being so late. Where as it was meant for three. There turned up 7. What was said in the gathering? In the Summary of Evidence (S of E) Lt Col Durrani picked out the most dangerous sounding portions and narrated them in S Of E, but still could not satisfy the prosecution you can yourselves decide whether even these amounted to any subversion or conspiratorial  talk. t is a pity that he has tried to be more incriminating by the time Lt Col Durrani and Naser joined us. It was already about 2200 hours and for the next two hours we saw visions and imagined all that could have done for the Army, a defeated army, a miserably led, dejected and bitter army, but an army we all loved, and in which we all loved and in which our fathers had served with honor, and in turn being honoured.  They say that " our old man shall dream dreams__ and your young man shall see visions, where there is no vision people shall perish". Well, we visualized what could be done, and what could be possible___ papers could have been written and forwarded, we had said ' Interviews could have been sought, the President could have been formally approached, we could rise in revolt against the Generals and present a 'fait accompli" to the president, we could have all resigned in masse and so on and on and on. As Durrani admitted at one time, these were all hallucinations of people who were talking in the spirit of " If I were in Powere"___I do not deny that the word 'coup' may have been uttered either in the context of various historical examples being quoted as admitted by Durrani in the S of E, or as one of the many hypocritical solutions and advanced in a heated academic Discussion.  A Coup-de-atet was NEVER discussed as practical or desirable course of action.    If this discussion and cribbing session as you may call it was improper that was all it was. It was a conspiracy, or even an attempted conspiracy, then or at any subsequent date, It was in short a new generation of young Pakistan Officers who were speaking about all the evil and the filth that over added a 'nevertheless' cherished society in uniform. And if all this that we have undergone since 30 Mar 73 has been because we have been unable to prevent our tongues wagging in the past, then let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike that this new generation of young Pakistani officers who have not tasted degradation of slavery, who have been tempered by war, and are still proud of their heritage , Have finally spoken and will not be bowed down any more by the malignant, the corrupt, and the tyrannical. If this type of talk was wrong. Then doing wrong is not always evil and dishonourable. Lt Col Nisar with due apologies to him and his rank, has been never known for his mental capabilities since the days he was my senior in the school. A discussion on the lines just outlined would inflict the severest of head aches upon him if he had tried to pay attention. A fact that for the bulk of the two hours that the discussion lasted he has admitted that he was either out of room or was not paying attention, would perhaps underline the reasons why he picked out odd utterances here and there added generally from his own imagination and linked them incoherently instead to convey  a wholly false and malicious meaning. I would hate to accuse him of doing this intentionally. I still wish to believe at this stage also, that he knew not what he was doing.  Sep passed and so did Oct, with us in the field, coming under odd week ends to Lahore. I did meet Major Shahid Attaullah by chance, as he stated, and had invited him home. The next day I was swamped by many gallant friends of mine now sitting here, as they had come to Lahore for the specific purpose of having jolly good time in the shortest while possible. We alleged conspirators, I am afraid, were far more ---?, in Maj Farooq Ehsan's attempt to uphold the good name of the army against the onslaught of three partially tipsy and one totally drunk officer. I had received to attend Maj Farooq Nawaz's wedding. Not having reliable transport, and wishing to take my wife along so as to spend the week end with iftikhar. I rang up Maj Shahid Attaullah in Sialkot. His wife was in Lahore. I wanted to convey to him that if he was going to come to lahore to pick up his wife before going to Jehlum, then I would also like to go along with them. The feeble and despicable attempt of converting taht telephone message and linking it with some 'selling of car' to attach a devious motive to it has been the brain wave of Maj Saleem and some others in the period between recording of S of E and the trail here. We did attend the wedding in Jhelum, which we left around 2300 hours so as to get back to Lahore. I did go to Iftikhar's house to say good bye to him and his wife. The account given by Maj Shahid Attaullah of what happened is incorrect. LT Col Hamdani and Capt Sarwar were not there. When Shahid was giving his statement of S of E, Lt Col Yousaf the officer recording the S of E had asked him if he recognized any other of the two or three officers who said were present in Jhelum. Maj Shahid had looked around and had specifically said that he had not recognized any one else. This fact was not recorded as Lt Col Yousaf said it was irrelevant. We were all dumb founded when Shahid turned around and pointed out these two officers in the trail here. Are we to believe that two weeks of solitary confinement here at Attock was enough inducement for him? We sat and talked. That led others to talk. It seemed to be quite the natural thing to do. Those who know Maj Shahid could tell you that he is not the type who would keep quiet in such a general discussion. Many views were expressed while Iftikhar tried arranging some food and bedding for his unexpected guests __ for the visitors were not expected.  There was no proposal for any "coup' and neither was there any need for Shahid or any one else to feel 'seduced' for no attempt to do so was made by anyone and no question of doing so arose because it was a casual discussion of a general nature. Having himself being a vocal critic Shahid found himself here at Attock and appears to have toed the line of the prosecution to earn his release. My friends in the prosecution don't have anything to say about me during the period Dec 18_ Mar 73. I wonder because it was Dec saw me as a defending officer in FGCM_ surprising as it may sound now, Jan saw me running a Div Battle School, where as in Feb and early Mar I was on P/Leave which I spent in Jhang trying to sort out my Land problems. I did not meet Brig F.B. Ali and Col Aleem in Gandasingh wala. I met Col Aleem two or three times in Lahore when I came on the long weekend here. These were social calls along with families I had gone a couple of times to Abbottabad and on these occasions I did normally make it a habit to visit my friends in the PMA Kakul. On one of these visits i went to Kakul with the purpose of seeing Lt Col Shakur Jan, and asking him to inquire about my posting to Jordan. He was not at home. I had then went to the mess and asked for him. It was there I met Maj Aminullah, from whom I asked about the where abouts of Lt Col Shahkur Jan.He said he was on leave. I left after a while but remembered that Maj Salim Akhtar was in the Mess whom I wanted to see. I was not hoping to meet Maj Aminullah again which he admits and only offered him a lift to his house. According to him it was he who invited me for a cup of coffee at the cafe, where we did go. I mad e no effort to try to see my other friend in the PMA, Maj Salim Asghar. I here by apologize to my friends opposite, for having deprived them of some evidence because of this over sight on my part. The discussion again in the Cafe commenced from innocent topics but drifted on to the general state of affairs in the Army and the country. In fact it was Maj Aminullah who provoked me by saying flattering things about the President, and blaming his stalwart henchman for most of the ills in the country, he himself admitted that I mad him no offer to join any organisation for the simple reason there was no ORGANISATION TO JOIN. Brilliant young officers thinking of doing something to improve the state of affairs in the Army did not mean any use of force. That leaves me to remark upon the attitude of Maj Aminullah here. I did not believe that he made any report at any time as there was nothing to report about. However, I am also reluctant to believe that his staff course in Australia has been too much of temptation. But what am I to believe after all? May I condone his actions considering that pointed efforts that were made by the special Branch in keeping a tag on what he had to say here in court. I am reminded of the time the intelligence representative pointedly came up and sat near the prosecution table. I am also referring to the chit that was placed in the manuscript of S of E in which open threats were hinted at.  What Col Tariq Rafi has to say about the alleged meetings during Mar is simply diabolic. Inspite of this angelic face countenance he has been then most deviously motivated individual that has come here. Among others I wish particularly to deny the following allegations. The list of some officers that he has shown in the court was not compiled for the purpose for which he has alleged here, and was not compiled on the date, time, and place he has mentioned. The forgery in the exhibit brought to the notice of the court is ample proof of that. This paper contains some jottings which I had done once in Rawalpindi at his instigation to the purpose of calculating number of concerned and critical officers which were friends of mine. It was neither a list of officers involved in any org nor was it to be given to him as is apparent from the many nicknames and initials used. It is also incorrect that I gave him any explanation or additional information on this subject as he now claims. At no time were any photographs or sketch of any presidency seen by me, and neither was any mention of the above ever made in my presence. At no time I have ever agreed to any 'coup' take over any government proposed by anyone. That is totally in correct.   Whenever I have seen Major Rana in 1973 never did he mention anything remotely connected with any existing conspiracy and neither have I said anything which could be considered subversive. He had never mentioned his meeting and talk with Iftikhar Adam. I find it extremely difficult to believe any such conversation, as alleged by Maj Rana, could have taken place knowing the natural reticence of Iftikhar Adam and his total disinclination to talk. This was known commonly amongst his friends. I found it amusing to have received Rugby jokes Book from him at the end of testimony here. I wonder if it was his way of eating his conscience. Then it was 30 March 73. I suppose everyone has a certain code by which one conducts himself in life. It is derived from many things among them may be family background, schooling, the society one moves around and literature one reads. I always believed in a certain code and have cherished such ideals as gallantry, chivalry, honour, respect and an undying belief in human dignity; But where were all these things that morning?   Can you drag an officer in pajama out of his house? Can you push him prod him barefoot in a vehicle? Can you handcuff and chain him like dogs in front of his watching women folk after he assures you he has no intention to resist? Can you throw him in a vehicle and chain him to the boards? And can you do all that under the provision pf the AR(I) which is now being quoted at us? Even if you do I hope to GOD that none of you also someday placed in the same position and hear your children screaming, and see the shock and horror in your eyes as you are dragged away bare foot and in chains; And then I hope, the meaning of the spirit of the rules laid down in the AR(I) will be clearer; But i shall tell you all about it. I shall tell you because you must know, and you must know because you are part of the same society of officers that I was part of. You must know exactly what was done.You must know that the precedent has been set for all those that still wear this once proud uniform. Can you all see a field officer in uniform locked up in a unit quarter guard?  Can you all see him and visualize the sentry outside who was weeping ashamedly? Can you visualize Officer in uniform handcuffed and chained and led in front of at least a hundred watching troops to a vehicle, and they being literally chained inside it? If you can do so, it would be more than I could have ever have done before to that day. Have you ever dreamt of an officer in uniform chained to a bed and at the end of the chain an NCO sitting besides you; And I wonder how you all will feel about the officer Corps as  whole. You must also know about the time we were being blindfolded and handcuffed by subalterns and JCOs; And you have to visualize and feel the hush and quiet that used to descend upon the Company of Engrs who were working here, when this procession used to start. You could have heard a pin fall. It was then that used to be grateful that i was blindfolded and could not see the degradation reflected in their eyes; But why if it was our degradation? Was not the degradation of the entire officer corps; Or were we already the convicted criminals instead of the officers that are still, until you decide otherwise. I hope I can forget it all someday but will I forget the time I needed to relieve myself, and know I was watched and observed by the sentries? Will i forget the smell the used to pervade the cell because the commode was not 10 feet away from my bed? Will I forget the day they kept the food in tin plates and use the commode as table? Will I forget the first 100 days when i used to crave for some darkness so i could sleep; And will I ever forget the glorious time when they allowed us to put off the night at night? What utter luxury that was? Can I ever forget the rattling of a chain and the chill of fear that i feel now even at the sound of it? The fear of further degradation. Can I ever forget the bite of a pair of handcuffs on my wrist? And will I forget the JCO who led me like a a puppy dog at the end of the chain. How many things I can mention to you all, i would have to give you account of something that have born and suppressed inside me all this while.Today I have the chance to speak__ perhaps the only chance and speak I shall. I shall, and must tell you of the day I wept in my cell. That was the day I peeped out when the now normal hush descended upon those outside and I knew some one was being taken. I looked outside and saw Brig Wajid Ali Shah. Brig Wajid I have not told you, but I saw you chained like I was chained. I saw both your hands handcuffed and I saw that Second Lieut. loading you by the chain. I recognized despite the towel they had wrapped around your eyes; And I wept not so much because they have done that to you, but I wept at your posture. You looked so dignified and you seemed so upright and straight, and others were the scum that wore this uniform on that day, God, I hated it as I have never hated anything in my life. They do say love and hate is divided by a hair breadth. It was then that it was crossed. After this incident it was anti climax, the day I saw my CO led around in the same manner. By then I was consumed by hatred. I was not going into the days of solitary confinement. However I do enter Capt Sajjad's cell now and then to remind myself of the 60 days I have spent in it in solitude. I look at the wall and see the 60 lines i have drawn for each day I spent. I look at those lines and remember the pleasure it used to give me waiting for the moment of the day when I could add another line. It was a ritual. I wonder if any one member of the court would find it worth while, to see that cell one of these days. Who was it who said that even if you spend one day in a prison cell you leave some portion of your self behind. Perhaps that is why I am so attached to that gloomy hole. The lesser said about the threats and intimidations  and the tactics of the interrogation here the better. The fact they restrained themselves only to the threat of violence and did not resort to it with me should, I suppose go to their credit. That brings us to the way the S of E was recorded and the things that have been said by the prosecution witness. All of us here are accused of charges that the Army hierarchy preferred against us. Someday, at some future date, when the high court of history sits in Judgement on each one of us our actions in his brief span of services will be measured, we hope not so much by what GHQ alleges, but by the answers to these questions: > Were we truly men of courage > Were we truly men of judgement > Were we truly men of integrity > Were we truly men of dedication What was the wrong that we actually done shall also come some day, and then it shall be known that whether that wrong was evil or dishonourable. However, with due apologies to Shakespeare  We shall be remembered We happy few We band of brothers and those not with us here and now think themselves accursed that they also were not here. For us time of departure is near, and we shall go our separate ways ----- you who sit in judgment to go and serve in the uniform we have loved so much, and we down here to where ever destiny will take us. As to which is  GOD ONLY KNOWS

Why some guys can't impress girls

Some guys just don't know to approach a girl. What hurdles do they face?

If you have passed out of college, here is a character you must have met sometime or the other. It is that of a guy who falls for a girl but doesn't know how to approach her. With wobbly knees and besotted eyes, he waits for her at the bus stop, hoping that she would smile at him for a nanosecond. If he bumps into her in the classroom, he starts getting uneasy the moment she starts chatting with some other guy. He is often bullied for being a permanent member of the club of 'universal brotherhood', that is, a guy who turns into every girl's brother because he fails to convert his crush into a relationship.


What are his major problems?

Imagining relationships: Whenever he falls for a girl – and he generally falls for too many girls – he tends to believe that she is in love with some other guy. Even if the girl has a casual conversation with a guy, our friend assumes that the two of them are on the verge of a relationship, if not in one already. That multiplies his hesitation manifold, and his emotions remain unstated till the girl actually finds someone. And, that someone turns out to be someone else.

Ladies first: This character is a moron. Overconfident and suffering from megalomania, he believes that every second girl has the hots for him. He doesn't have the guts to propose, but tells the world that the girl should be the one who ought to come forward. That never happens, and he continues to vegetate.

Too good: A victim of inferiority complex, this guy manages to pedestalise every girl he falls for. She is so good that she is beyond reach: that thought keeps his lips sealed, whether or not the girl is a Meg Ryan lookalike. He continues to torment himself without making any effort to reach out. She, you are right, remains clueless.

Everything in life takes some effort. So do relationships. Most seem to know that, barring those who wait near the bus stop, hoping for that smile that means nothing.

By Biswadeep Ghosh

Image Source: Thinkstock photos/Getty Images